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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY . .A.LEX ... \XDER, RALPH H. 
ALEX ... \XDER and E\"'"EL YN 
ALEXANDER HO\VICK, 
Plaintiffs and Respondfnts, 
vs. 
ZION'S S ... \ VINGS BANK & TRUST 
CO:J[P ... \XY, a corporation, 
Defendant, 
and 
HANNAH \VILSON ALEXANDER, 
Defenda,nt and Appellant. 1 
Case No. 
8042 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEI\{ENT OF FACTS 
A. PRELIMINARY S.TATEMENT 
Throughout this brief the parties will be referred 
to as follo\vs: The plaintiffs and respondents, Harry 
Alexander, R'alph H. Alexander and Evelyn Alexander 
Hovvick will frequently be referred to as the beneficia-
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riP:-;; tl1(' 'lPf<·ndant and appellant, Hannah Wilson Alex-
a•uh•r, \\'ill lH· I'Pf(~rred to as the wife or widow. The 
' ~"t tlor, IIPnr~· .:\. AlPxand<·r, will occasionally be referred 
to a:-; tlt1· hu~lJall(l. 
.All itali(·:--: an~ ours. 
B. TIl J·: F .:\errs 
rrllP n·~lHHH)(-'flt~ ha\'(~ no substantial dispute with 
tltP fa<·t:--: a~ n·Jated in appellant's brief. The differences 
a rising het\veen the parties concern the interpretation 
of the facts as stated. 
:--;T~\TE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW 
HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID 
PROPERTY SINCE THE TRUST WAS VALID AND REAL 
AND GAVE THE HUSBAND AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE 
TO WHICH THE STATUTORY INTEREST COULD NOT 
ATTACH. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW 
HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID 
PROPERTY SINCE THE HUSBAND HAD NO GREATER 
TITLE THAN AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE IN THE 
PROPERTY. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW 
HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
SINCE THE HUSBAND GAINED NO INTEREST IN 
ADDITION TO AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE BY REASON 
OF THE CONVEYANCE BY A THIRD PARTY OF THE 
PROPERTY TO THE TRUSTEE. 
THE ACTIONS OF THE WIDOW SHOULD PRECLUDE 
HER FROM NOW ASSERTING HER STATUTORY INTER-
EST IN THE PROPERTY. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW 
HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID 
PROPERTY SINCE THE TRUST WAS VALID AND REAL 
AND GAVE THE HUSBAND AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE 
TO WHICH THE STATUTORY INTEREST COULD NOT 
ATTACH. 
The assertion and argument of appellant that the 
trust in question was illusory and that the Zion's Sav-
ings Bank & Trust Company was an ~gent rather than a 
trustee is entirely without merit under the facts of this 
ca~e and existing law. 
The trust was originally created by a formal written 
agree1nent betvveen the two "trustors" and the trustee 
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(J~~x ... 1 ,,). 'l'he ~·tru~tor~" reserved the use and incoine 
uf t}IP }ll'OpPrty in the tru~t fund for their joint liVeS. 
'l'lll· ··tru~tors" al:-;o r<~:-;erved unto thernselves jointly and 
t11 thP ~urvivor thP right to revoke the trust in whole or 
in '1 1a rt and tll<' r i ~!·ht to a1nend such reYocation or a111end-
. ' 
lllPllt to bP in \rritill,~ and signed hy the "'trustors" during 
tlu·ir ,joint lifetillH .. or the :-:urvivor of them (Ex. "1", par. 
I). 'l'ht· tru~te(~ \\'a~ .rriv<~n po\r(~rs of sale of trust prop-
Prt~· and of <_..xeeution of n<·t(~~~ary legal documents (Ex. 
""}", par. 4). 'fhe tru~tee \ras giYen the duties of paying 
<'X}H:'Jl:-:t·~ of last illnes:-; and funeral charges of the 
~urYiYnr and distributing the balance remaining in the 
fund to th(' beneficiaries specifically named (the respond-
ents herein) in the shares designated, and further if 
either of the t\\·o grandchildren at the time of distribu-
tion be a rninor, the trustee had the further duty to. 
rnanage the share of such minor during minority for 
the benefit of said minor using its own discretion in ful-
filling the goal~ set out (Ex. •'1", par. 3). 
Respondents maintain that by the great weight of 
authority in this country, such a transaction as is in-
volYed in this case, constituted an enforceable trust and 
gave the beneficiaries a vested interest subject to divest-
rnen t by the exercise of the power of revocation. There-
fore, the trust not having been revoked, the beneficiaries 
are entitled to their respective interests as provided in 
the trust document. See Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, pars. 
57.1, 57.2; 73 A.L.R. 209; 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521, Trusts and 
The Statut.e of Wills by Austin W. Scott. 
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Indeed, at 1'3 .. A.L.R. p .. :!1.2. it is stated: 
Hlnstead of ilnparting a testa1nentary charae-
ter to the instrtunent, the reservation of a right of 
revocation has been held to rebut the idea that 
the instrun1ent \Yas intended as a testamentary 
disposition of property, since such a reservation 
\vould be "~holly superfluous if the instru1nent 
\vere a \vill, as a will requires no express power 
to make it revocable." 
Citing Hall 1·. Burklzauz) 59 Ala. 3-!9 and Cribbs v. 
Walker) 85 S.W. 2-!-! . 
.. A.n excellent discussion of the la\v on this point is 
contained in the case of Rose v. Rose (Mich. 1942), 1 
N.\V-. :2d 458, where the settlor retained a beneficial life 
estate plus a power of revocation plus extensive powers 
of control over the trustee. The case held that title to 
the trust property passes to the trustee by virtue of the 
trust in~trument and that the beneficiaries take vested 
intere~ts in the property, the powers reserved to the 
trustor a1nounting to conditions subsequent, upon the 
happening of which the vested interests are divested. 
Also, see Kelly v. Pa.rker) 54 N.E. 615; Goodrich et al v. 
City J~.Tational Bank & Trust Company of Battle Creek) 
258 N.\V. 253; and K eck v. McKinstry e.t al.J 221 N.W. 
851. 
The case of Kelly v. Pa,rker placed significance in 
the fact that the subject matter of the trust was land and 
that it \vas conveyed by a formal instrument in which the 
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}llll'})U~P~ or tllP t ru~t \Vere fully stated. Along this line 
ul' thinki11g' the Uf'slntr'Jnent of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 
~,7, par. g:, p. 17~', ~tates: 
''In clt•t(·rtnining \\'hether the reserved po\vers 
a J'( • ~o grc·~t t a:-: to n1ake the trustee an agent of 
tht• :-:<~ttlor, ()lle of t}l(~ factors to he considered is 
tlu~ fonualit~· of tlH~ tran:-:aetion. Thus, if the 
tran:--:r .. r to t}H~ trust(--e \\'as by a deed for1nally 
~'XeeutPd a11d r(·(·on](~d, the eonclusion that the 
tru~t<·P \ra~ al~o the agent of the settlor would be 
I··~~ likely to he dra,vn than if the transfer were 
le~~ for1nall~· eYidenced." 
''"'hen all i~ ~aid and done, the determination of the 
<·a~es on this ~u bjeet boils do\vn to an interpretation by 
the court of the intent of the settlor. It is stated in the 
case of Talbot et al r. Talbot et al., 78 A. 535, that in 
deter1nining \vhether or not there w·as an intent to create 
a trust, the facts should be construed as strongly as 
possible in favor of a trust. In a case with more powers 
reserved to the settlor than in the case at bar, Nichols v. 
Enzery et al., (Calif.), -!1 Pac. 1089, the court, speaking 
about the reservation of the right of revocation, stated: 
"Indeed, this power of reservation was 
strongly favored in the case of voluntary settle-
n1ents at common law, and such a trust, without 
such a reservation was open to suspicion of undue 
advantage taken of the settlor." 
Citing Lew,in, Trusts, pp. 75, 76, and Perry, Trusts, par. 
104. 
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It is \Yondered if therP can he an~· doubt \Yhnt~oevPr 
in the present case, but that the intent of the ~Pttlor \\'as 
to create a legal and binding trust. ~rhe ~ettlor and his 
fir~t 'vife created the trust, of their ho1ne and certain 
per~onal property, obYiously for their o\rn present benefit 
and for the ulti1nate benefit of their O\rn heirs. Ho"v can 
the ~ettlor be said to have given up nothing when his 
fir~t 'vife, E1nily, 'vas giYen a life interest along with 
hin1 a~ a joint beneficiary f Ho'\Y can it be said that the 
bank \\~as the n1ere agent of Henry A. Alexander when 
the property \Vas for1nally conveyed to the said bank 
and w·hen said bank 'vas given duties to perform in rela-
tion to the property so given J? ''r ould not the overthrowing 
of thi~ trust agreement as testamentary be the grossest 
kind of derogation of the intent of Henry A. Alexander 
that the heirs of himself and his first wife, En1ily J. 
Alexander, should ultimately have the full ownership of 
the property that he and Emily had accumulated during 
their 1narriage? Is it so strange that a man and wife 
should desire their own children and grandchildren to 
succeed to the property they accumulate during their 
1narriage~ And what of the distribution provided in the 
tru~t instrument leaving shares of the remainder to 
specifically named persons~ Is the court to ignore this 
provi~ion and hold that these beneficiaries so named have 
no interest at all under the trust agreement~ Respond-
ent:' re~pectfully sub1nit that the overwhelming weight of 
authority gives these beneficiaries an in11nediate vested 
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intPrP~t in the trust property, subject only to being 
div<ll"ted by exE~n·ise of the powers of revocation or 
RlllPJHltnen t. 
In tl1P aJrH~ndtnent '"hi('h \Vas Pxecuted hy Henry A . 
. \lPxan(h•r (J~:x. --~'') a further reaffirmation of Henry 
.. \. :\lPX(lltdPr'~ intPnt is sho,vn '''hen he provided for the 
ri,!.d1t of personal use and ol·(·upane~· of the home by his 
:'P<·ond "·if .. , oPfendant herein, and in the last sentence 
:'ta ted: 
"Further I herel)y declare said original trust 
agree1nent as herehy amended to be in full force 
and effect." 
1 t appears that the possibility of a second wife's 
:'tatutory dower interest interfering with the rights of 
the heirs of Henry ... l . ..._llexander and Emily J. Alexander 
could indeed haYe even been a reason for establishing 
such a trust fund. 
The cases cited by appellant in her brief are in the 
1nain not in point and the ones which may be in point 
represent a minority point of view. 
The case of Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust 
Co., 196 N.W. 829, which relies on McEvoy v. Bo-ston 
Five Cents Savings Bank, 87 N.E. 465, represents a weak 
stand in the law of trusts. The W arsco case itself could 
not be used as authority in Wisconsin today inasmuch 
as a later statute has changed the law in Wisconsin so as 
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to conforn1 \Yith th~ 1najorit:· _point of YiP\\~ ( 1Vis. 6Ytnt. 
1933, par. ~~il.~05). 
The J/ cEvoy ea~e '"a~ subsequently "·eakened in 
~Iassachu~ett~ by the case of J one<~· c. Old Colony Trust 
Co._, 146 X.E. 716, a. case "·ith yery si1nilar facts which 
held that there \Yas a. Yalid trust. For a discussion of 
the~e cases, see 43 Hart~. L. Ret:., p. 531 and following; 
and Scott on Trusts, \'"ol. 1, par. 57.2. 
The X e\v York cases cited by appellant involve situ-
ations \vhere husbands are attempting to defeat rights 
given wives under a N e\v York statute and are therefore 
not in point. The same comment applies to the Ohio 
cases. 
Other cases upholding respondents' view of the law 
on this subject are as follows: 
T ... an Cott v. Prent,ice and others, 10 N.E. 257; 
Kelley v. Sno1r et al., 70 N.E. 89; 
Roche v. Brickley, 150 N.E. 866; 
Lines v. Lines et al., 21 A. 809; 
Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., et al., 91 A. 634; 
Beirne v. Continental Equ,itable T1·ust Co., 161 A. 
721· 
' 
Louise Berg;uann v. Forem.an State Trust and 
Savings Bank et al., 273 Ill. App. 408. 
Also, ~ee Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, , ... ol. 1, par. 104. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
l:>OINrr II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW 
Hl·:lt ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID 
PROPERTY SINCE THE HUSBAND HAD NO GREATER 
TITLE THAN AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE IN THE 
PROPERTY. 
In app(dlant's Point II thP argument if3 rnade that 
llt·Jtry .. \ . .~\l•~xaud<~r O\\'lled full and con1plete equitable 
tith~ to tht· pr()pPrty in quP;;;fioH to which the statutory 
int(•f't>~t attaclted. 
'T'1H~ l'l-':-'}HHtdent:' haYe n() disagreeinent \vith the cases 
cited h~T ap1Jellant "Thith hold that dower will attach to 
an (•qnitable fee sin1ple estate. [;Ttah Code Annotated, 
l.fJ.j.'J, See. 7-1--1-3 u1akes it clear that the widow's interest 
1 ,rovided therein "Till attach to an equitable fee simple 
e~tate in real property possessed by the husband at any 
ti1ne during the n1arriage. However, it is also clear, 
under the facts in this case and under existing law, that 
the settlor retained only an equitable life estate and not 
an equitable fee si111ple estate, and therefore, the \vido'v 
does not qualify under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 
7-1:-4-3. 
_A_ny such reasoning as suggested by appellant would 
state that the beneficiaries specifically named in the 
trust agreement had nothing but a mere expectancy. It 
is difficult to see h·ow the terms of a formal agreement 
could be so utterly disregarded as to hold that the bene-
ficiaries had no more than they would have had, had 
there been no trust agreement at all. 
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It is stated in Tiffany Rea.l Propert!J, rPhird :BJd. \r ol. 
1, at page 81: 
·•\\~hile the gift of a power of disposition to 
one to \Yhonl the property has been devised \Yith-
out "\Vords of lin1ita tion has been regarded as suf. 
ficient to sho\Y an intention to give hi1n an estate 
in fee simple, no such effect properly follows fro1n 
the gift of a power to one to who1n a life~ estate 
has been explicitly given. In other "\Vords, the gift 
of a power of disposition does not enlarge an 
estate for life to an estate in fee simple, especially 
\vhere the power is limited to disposition in the 
lifetin1e of the devisee, * * * * Somewhat singu-
larly, in a few states, a contrary view has been 
asserted, provided the power is general in charac-
ter." 
.. A .. thorough study of the law on this point is con-
tained in 36 A.L.R. 1218. In that annotation, the minority 
cases cited were all from West Virginia., Virginia., 
Tennessee, and Michigan. The rule has later been 
changed by statute in the states of West Virginia, Vir-
ginia, and Tennessee, to conform with the majority point 
of view. See Tiffan;y Real Property, Third Edition, Vol. 
1, Footnote 79, p. 83. 
It appears to respondents that the cases cited by 
appellant represent an exceedingly small minority view 
and possibly a confusion by courts of cases of dissimilar 
fact situations with the rule of Shelley's case. It seems 
inconceivable that such reasoning could defeat the rights 
of specifically named beneficiaries as exist in the trust 
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a~roPtnent involved in this caHe. Such reasoning could 
hP u:--:('d to defeat the obviou~ intent of the settlor as it is 
in this ease, wh<·n~ beneficiaries were specifically named 
to n·<·Pi ve Hueh of the estate as remained in the trust 
l'und at ~Pttlor~s d<'ath. The two gifts certainly are not 
i11<·on~i~t('nt "'ith ea<·h other inas1nuch as the beneficiaries 
intPrP~t~ only <~xi:-:ted in such property as had not been 
takPn out of the trust at the tiiue of the settlor's death. 
Ut·spond~Ht:-; reassert that they had a vested interest 
in the trust fro111 the ti1ne of the c·reation of the trust, 
subjt·et only to be defeated by a condition subsequent, 
revo<-·ation or a1nendn1ent by both of the joint "trustors" 
or the surviYor. F,urthertnore, appellant's argument could 
only c-onceivably apply to a settlor who had reserved to 
hitnself a life estate. That is not the fact in this case 
ina~n1ueh as the estate reserved was for the joint lives 
of Henry· .A.. Alexander and his first wife, Emily J. 
Alexander. 
11he appellant n1akes an argument indicating that 
the "Tife's statutory interest should attach due to the fact 
that the husband, at his death, had the power of dispo-
sition over the propert~T· Such reasoning would lead to 
a rule of law that dower attaches to a mere right of 
revocation. This is certainly a far cry from a freehold 
estate \vhich children of the marriage would inherit. 
See 17 Am. Jur. p. 687. It is needless to say that the 
respondents have been unable to find any cases which go 
as far as to allow dower to attach to such an interest. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE WIDOW 
HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
SINCE THE HUSBAND GAINED NO INTEREST IN 
ADDITION TO AN EQUITABLE LIFE ESTATE BY REASON 
OF THE CONVEYANCE BY A THIRD PARTY OF THE 
PROPERTY TO THE TRUSTEE. 
l,..nder Point III of appellant's brief, it is argued 
that the "?ife's statutory interest attached to the prop-
erty in question by reason of the transaction whereby 
the original real property in the trust fund was conveyed 
to a third party by the trustee in exchange for the 
present property in the fund conveyed on the same date 
by the third party to the trustee. The form executed by 
Henry .... ~. Alexander with respect to the new property 
(Ex. 3) stated that said property coming to the trustee 
was to be held subject to the original trust agree1nent, 
"as if the same for all intents and purposes had been 
deposited with you at the time of making said agree-
ment." The evidence is uncontroverted that the legal 
title to the present trust property passed directly by 
warranty deed from Louis D·eYoung and Louise S. De-
young, grantors, to Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Com-
pany, grantee (Ex. 5). The obvious purpose of the in-
strument executed by Henry A. Alexander with respect 
to this property (Ex. 3) was to inform the trustee that 
this property was to be held subject to the original trust 
as if originally deposited in said trust. 
It js difficult to ascertain the ground on which appel-
lant relies in asserting that Henry A. Alexander at any 
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t i tne had l'ull legal and equitable title to this property. 
rl'ltt· only <·vidt·rwP subtnitted on the subject is the War-
rant~· l><·<><l fro1u tlu~ DeYoungs to the Zion's Savings 
I ~ank ~ 'l'ru~t Cotupany. 
'l'h(' n<·xt ground urg(~d by appellant is that the 
hu~hand, at oJH· ti111e had full equitable title to this prop-
Prty l·~· rPa~o11 of the aforernentioned transaction. The 
only P\'idt·n(·t· on the Hubject indicates a straight trade 
lwt\\"t><·n tltt· DeYoungs and the Bank (Exs. 3 and 4). 
'l'here i~ no \rritten <'Ontract alleged or proved py appel-
lant. }{.p~pondents agree "~ith appellant on what the law 
i~ in t~tah a~ laid do\\·n by the case of ll1cNeil v. McNeil, 
Gl litah 141, :211 Pac. 988 (1922). Respondents agree 
that in such a situation the husband must be in a position 
to co1npel eonyeyance to hin1self under the contract be-
for(:_• the "~ife'~ statutor~~ interest will attach. This is a 
situation "·here equity has looked at that being done 
\Yhieh should be done under the contract. However, 
there is no contract to enforce in the present case. Even 
if there "·ere such a contract, to whom could the husband 
have co1npelled conveyance·~ Not to himself, but to an-
other. It is generally stated that the estate to which 
do,ver attaches Inust be an inheritable estate, so that the 
children, if any, of the marriage would inherit it. 17 
Anz. Jur. 687. It seems inconceivable that there ever 
\Yas an interest present \Vhich could have been inherited 
by children of the second marriage. It is respectfully 
sub1nitted that Henry A. Alexander never, at any time, 
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had any intere8t in the trust property in question other 
than his interest8 by virtue of the trust agree1nent . 
.J..\ccording to the rea8oning offered by appellant, 
the \Yife, 8i1nply by the trade heretofore mentioned, 
\vould have a statutory do,ver interest not only in the 
property presently in the trust, but also in the property 
no\Y held by the DeY oungs. This certainly would appear 
to be an a1nazing result in vie'v of the fact that she never 
did have an interest in the original trust property which 
had been placed in the trust years before her n1arriage 
to Henry .J..\. Alexander by Henry A. Alexander and his 
first wife, E1nily J. Alexander. 
The rule as established by the MeN eil case is a rule 
determining interests under an executory contract for 
the sale of land. It is difficult to understand how this 
case and like cases could apply to the facts of the case at 
bar. In the case at bar, it appears that there vva.s an 
instantaneous exchange of properties. An executory 
contract does not appear to have existed at any time. 
Although it is not argued in appellant's brief, it 
appears to respondents that the court may consider 
whether or not a resulting trust could be present. It 
immediately occurs to respondents that such a concept 
would be highly incongruous in the facts of the present 
case, as it would present the question of having a result-
ing trust inconsistent with and opposed to a prior express 
trust. 
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rrhe c·a:..;e of Ml~lenky ,,;. Melen et al., 134 N.E. 822, 
opinion by J uHtice Cardozo, presents a somewhat analo-
g-ou:..; :..;ituation. In that <'a:..;e a widower conveyed a parcel 
of" land to hi:..; :..;on eoupled with an oral prornise to recon-
\'<•y on detuancl. Later, the \vidower remarried. Subse-
quently, on dt~utand, the son refused to reconvey to the 
rather hut did ('ODV(ly a life estate which the father 
a('<·<·pt<~cl. It \ra~ held in that ~a~e that the father could 
enfon·t· a <·onveyan<·t· if there was an abuse of confidence, 
but that this ri~bt ,,·a~ a chose in action and not seisin 
to ''" hic:h do\vt) r could attach. 
J n t1H· case at bar it is difficult to see any possibility 
of :--:eisin in the husband, but only rights to obtain prop-
erty, \\·hich he did not choose to exercise. 
In the case of Phelp~ c. Phelps et al., 38 N.E. 280, 
tht> husband paid for certain lands and had them con-
veyed to a third party under an agreement that the 
h u~ band receive all of the benefits and have full control 
over ~aid lands. The court held that there was no dower 
in ~aid lands, stating: 
~·To entitle the \vife to dower, the husband 
1nust be seised either in fact or in law, of a pres-
ent freehold in the premises, as well as of an 
estate of inheritance." 
The court held that the husband had no such estate. 
Also, the case of Nash v. Kirshoff, 208 N.W. 193, held 
that the purchase of property by a husband and his 
' 
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taking the conveyanre in the na1ne of another does not 
g·iye the "~ife 1na.rital rights therein, citing .L1mm.u.ndson 
r. Hauson, 1S5 X.,,:. 252. 
Cases holding contrary to the above-1nentioned cases 
are eases 'vhere it has appeared that there has been 
fraud on the rights of the \Yife. There is positivel~~ no 
"~hisper of fraud in the case at bar. In the case at bar, 
the \Yife is asserting a statutory interest in property 
conveyed in trust by Henry A. Alexander and his first 
'vife. The property in the trust fund, at no time reverted 
to Henry .A. Alexander, and the second wife could not 
possibly haYe been. defrauded as to property traded in 
exchange for property in which she, at no time had any 
interest. On the contrary, it appears that Henry A. 
Alexander \Yas very much concerned about protecting 
the \velfare of his second wife, should she survive him, 
by amending the trust so as to allow her to live in the 
hon1e as long as she should desire (Ex. 2). 
Because of the above reasoning and law, the respond-
ents 1naintain that it is inconceivable that the second 
wife, Hannah Wilson Alexander, could have gained a 
statutory do\ver interest in the present trust property 
because of the exchange of the property originally in the 
trust for the property presently in the trust. 
POINT IV. 
THE ACTIONS OF THE WIDOW SHOULD PRECLUDE 
HER FROM NOW ASSERTING HER STATUTORY INTER-
EST IN THE PROPERTY. 
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'l'l1(' J'('~pono(•nt~ further contend that Hannah Wil-
~on ~\ lt-xarHh·r, h(·eau~e of her conduct, should now be 
··~topped l'rotn a~~erting her ~tatutory interest in the 
l•~""IH'rty iu qu(·~tion. The trust in question was estab-
li~h•·d by I-lc·nry .A .. \h·xander and his first wife, Emily 
.J. .. \lt·\arJdt-r, 011 ,January 10, 1930, said trust providing 
that the· ultitJI:tt(• b(•JH·fi(·iari(~~ be the son and t\VO grand-
('hildrt>ll of said llenry ~\. and Emily J. Alexander. At 
a :-:ub~Pquent ti111t-, J~~utily .J. Alexander died. Subsequent 
to thi~, on N o\TeHtber :~, 1936, Henry A. Alexander mar~ 
ri(·d tlu_} present Hannah \Vilson Alexander, a sister of 
l~Inily J .. Alt·xander (R. ;)1). Hannah Wilson Alexander 
rau1e into thi~ 1uarriage \\Tith her own separate property, 
a ho1ne located at -!57 La1nbourne Avenue, Salt Lake 
(
1ity, l"""tah (R. 51). On July 11, 1940, Henry A. Alex-
ander executed an amendment to the Trust Agreement 
giving Hannah ''1ilson Alexander, should she survive. 
hi1n, the right to live in the ho1ne held in the trust fund, 
as long as she should desire, said right not to extend 
to a life estate but confined to personal use and occu-
pancy. 
On September 9, 1941, Hannah Wilson Alexander 
conveyed her home at 457 Lambourne Avenue to her 
son, Henry 'Vilson, and his wife, Gertrude Wilson, as 
joint tenants and to the survivor (R. 51). 
Henry A. Alexander died in June of 1943 (R. 46). 
After his death, Hannah Wilson Alexander continued 
to live in the home which is the subject matter of the 
trust, until May of 1952 (R. 46) or approximately nine 
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Year~. In :Jlay of 1~)3~ Hannah \,ViJson --:\lexander 1noved 
out of this ho1ne and the beneficiaries 1nade a dPlnand 
on the trustee to distribute the trust fund (R·. -l-0). It 
appears fron1 these facts that Henry .1\. _AJexander in-
tended to fully provide for the \Yelfare of his second 
'vife, Hannah, consi~tent "Tith the terins of the trust and 
ultimate gift to his son and grandchildren by his first 
1narriage. Consistent to this sche1ne of things, Hannah 
\\~ilson ~-\lexander subsequently conveyed her separate 
property, the home at 457 Lan1bourne A venue, to her 
son by a prior marriage. After the death of Henry A . 
..L-\lexander, Hannah Wilson Alexander accepted the bene-
fits provided by the amendment to the trust and lived 
in the home in the trust fund for approximately nine 
years. Now, at this time, she asserts that the trust was 
invalid and never existed. If this be the fact, she has de-
prived the son and grandchildren of Henry A. Alexander 
from property they would have inherited, for a period of 
approximately nine years. The respondents assert that 
this inconsistent conduct on the part of appellant has 
worked greatly to their disadvantage and therefore 
she should be estopped from now asserting her statu-
tory dower interest. It is believed that an analogy 
can be made to the following statement at 17 Am. Jur. 
735: 
"Another class of estoppel arises where a 
woman accepts a provision under a will and, in the 
sa1ne will, a gift is made to others which is mani-
festly intended to carry a title free of encum-
brance. In this case, on the principle that one 
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cannot clahn under and at the same time against 
a will and by analog-y to the case of a devise by 
the husband in lieu of dower she is estopped to 
(·laitll dower in derogation of the other gift." 
In a l Ttalt (·as(·, Ln re Kjar's Estate, 220 Pac. 501, 
ti~ l"talt 4~7, it was held that a husband's conveyance of 
all hi~ prOJH'rty in anti<·i pation of death to his wife and 
othPr lllPtnhers of his fatnily, in the absence of evidence 
to the ('Ontrary, \rill he· pr(~~u1ued to have been made with 
her (•on~('nt and ,,·ill operate a~ a relinquish1nent of her 
onP-thi nl l"tatutory interest. 
It is subtnitted that the an1endment to the trust oper-
ating to give Hannah ''Tilson Alexander a home to live 
in for the rest of her life if she desired, her subsequent 
conve~·ance of her own ho1ne to her son by a prior mar-
riage, her subsequent acceptance of the use of the home 
for nine years and now her assertion that there was no 
tru~t, all fit together to show a scheme of things whereby 
a 'Yife has relinquished any statutory right she would 
have in the home. 
The age and physical condition of Hannah Wilson 
Alexander (R. 27, R. 46) when viewed in the light of the 
facts stated, tend strongly to an inference that her claim 
'vas not really urged by herself but by her son who will 
inherit whatever property she receives. 
Because of the above facts it is believed that appel-
lant should be estopped from now asserting a statutory 
one-third interest in the property in question. 
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CONCJ~USION 
On the basis of the faets and the elear la \V on the 
~ubject, looking at the case as a 'vhole, it is clear that 
there is nothing Inore than an intervivos trust 'vhich 
Yes ted estates in the beneficiaries prior to the marriage 
of the settlor and the appellant. After this 1na.rriage, 
there "~as a sin1ple exchange of one property for another 
"Tith titles passing direct ... A ..s a result of the above trans-
actions, the statutory one-third interest never attached 
to the property and the beneficiaries are now entitled to 
their shares as provided in the trust agreement. 
Therefore, the Decree of the trial court wa.s correct 
and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Counsel for Pla,intiffs and 
R.espondents. 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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1~ete1ved ------------------------ copies of the \Vithin Brief of 
l~espondent~ this ------------···· day of ........................................ , 
A.D. 1933. 
Counsel for Defendant and Appellant 
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